Saturday, October 27, 2007

individuals, marx, and the loving hope of weblogs

Today at the University of Pittsburgh, (my “haunts” these years) a symposium was held by the journal boundary 2 , with talks by the likes of William Spanos, Jonathan Arac, and Pitt’s new creative writing/poetry hire Ben Lerner (if you have not read The Lichtenberg Figures or Angle of Yaw you should begin tonight!). All of the talks were quite excellent. But while I was musing on why this journal, which I admire as urgent and pressing the way one might admire the Hedghog Review , can gesture no further back than the Early Modern Period in its areas of study in which they find a way to deal with the present and the future, a number of thoughts coalesced and began to come to a more conscious form of crises with respect to my thinking in general than they were, say, yesterday.

Lindsay Waters (currently of Harvard U P) gave a talk on the “The Shape of a Humanist’s Career.” The final upshot of the talk was basically that tenure for Humanities scholars is being forced in the standards of tenure for science scholars, and that this is generally a bad thing—both producing generally bad effects and a symptom of a kind of lack of willing to “trust our FEELINGS” in the Humanities—forcing scholars to produce at a rate incommensurate with thinking appropriate a rigorous standard of Academic freedom. Great. I agree.

But, Lindsay proceeded to say some other things along the way, by way of proving his point, which brought to the fore the things I was not previously sure were haunting me. He suggested a number of examples by which scholars of severe importance would never have received tenure by today’s standards: Said, DeMan, et al. He noted that many scholars require much time to really do their “most important work” but often scholars that do create immensely important works early in their careers do so with the aid of a Working Group , and that it is immensely strange how much we demand an “individual” to prove of her/himself in these parts. Lindsay proceeded to note the potential importance and untapped resource of more communal work—for to the benefit of the young scholar struggling, and to the general end of fostering truly innovative work in the name of a radical hope which is needed in the face of despair in this country. And yet, Lindsay noted in a comment, later, that it seems there is a shift to return to considering a “subject” or an “individual” in the face of the despair produced by the internal colonization of the American empire: and this is what is at stake in Spivak’s recent turn to teaching “reading” and “aesthetics” (in a meeting with grad. students at Pitt. last year she told about 15 of us: suspend yourself in the text. You do not know how to read...people do work, and it is good work or it is bad work, they impose a political reading on a text without reading it and what do you have, you have a wasted life [paraphrased from notes and memory]) as a kind of practice of reinforcing some semblance of individuality. This is why “the subject” is still a viable concern of American poetry and why the “I” can be a dramatic and contested staging in a contemporary poem in an attempt to deal with life and take on power that can’t be taken on effectively. He acknowledges a sort of productive tension between the individual and the community as key to producing work that can foster a radical hope.

Lindsay thus pulled together, to risk abstracting, the following terms: hope, futurity, the individual, community: and the private and public aspects of intellectual work as property and in terms of its means of production. In my mind, they come to crises in the following ways:

In some recent conversations with Sarah of danaidean , I have been prompted to ask why the workings of an individual mind in isolation is expected to produce the work of the intellectual, and if this is not symptomatic of a general sense of “private” property which holds back a kind of radical communalism of thought which might allow for a radically more productive kind of academic work. I ask this only with much anxiety, as, to be honesty, while I benefit immensely from In The Middle, Babel--, these places and people in fact make possible for me, thinking and feeling as intellectual and Ethical labor which I could never imagine in isolation—actually surrendering my work to an Other is frightening experience. I performed a reading of poems last year with my friend Robin Clarke, and we, instead of reading separately, constellated our poems into a single performance, taking turns reading poems or a series of our own poems, and letting them speak between each other rather than in isolation. The labor and the product were communal between two individual, and even this was a scary experience—risking “intention” or “individuality” even on the smallest scale. One of the reasons one may write poems may, to psychologize, involves the dance of control and lack of control a writer experiences with her poem which is, often quite private. But, I cannot help but wonder seriously, very seriously, at the merits of rethinking how and why we value the work of the individual. We test individual students. Individual minds must on their own come up with the ideas that we take refuge in Affective Communities of readers and colleagues in order to accomplish. And, a marxist critique of access to the means of academic production, and private ownership of academic material, may be one untimely way of thinking about this, however uncomfortable.

All of this is said in the name of a kind of futurity. A kind of radical hope. The radical rootless hope one catches a whiff of in the midst of the absolute anxiety of OUR present when watching Alfonso Cuorón’s Children of Men. For a while I have engaged with futurity in my studies and production of literary texts, as a possibility, and a desirable one, I have done so unsure of how I felt about it. See, aet the same time, I have read the work which Eileen Joy at Kalamazoo last spring called symptomatic of the White Man’s last Stand: Leo Bersani, Lee Edelman, etc., and been absolutely riveted by the generous but ruthless spirit of Negative critique which they are able to inhabit. To be honest, it can excite me, no matter how cynical. One only needs to read a sampling of Auden’s verse to know that disenchantment can be absolutely enchanting. I have been on the fence quite a bit, not only for my own affective reactions to work concerned with futurity or No futurity (on the side of futurity I am intrigued from Heidegger to Dinshaw—and in my department, Heidegger can hold some serious sway), but also concerned that Futurity can only result in a kind of Religious Humanist project when what is at stake is the Disciplining of Bodies and state power itself.

But, the more I consider problems of temporality, and the problems of the sacred and the secular, I am no longer sure that this is the real trouble. I mean—the trouble is that while we can’t give up the terms sacred or secular, they need radical reconsideration, and I need to admit the myriad of concepts and bodies which trouble them in a way that produces a radical hope. Secular or not. So. The problem, futurity, or no futurity (most reductively). Can futurity and the excitement in the spirit of negative critique be commensurate? Can there be a futurity without an unfounded religious hope and religious notion of time? (I feel like late Derrida is my hint here...despite the fact that this material has already been “in” and perhaps has run its course as “popular.”)


So. I don’t claim this as my own personal crises. I am certainly not thinking about this problem for the first time, nor the last, and, really, its not a set of questions that plenty of people are not and have not asked before. But I like these questions. Can I be "for" the future or not--ethically, do I need to decide? What is a subject? Can we want one? Why? Radical hope seems to both need the individual AND a radical communalism. It seems that what might emerge as a possibility from all of this, not as an answer to the dilemma, but as a way of thinking though it—is to get out of thinking about economics, and instead think about Love. Believing what we feel seems key to this, which takes me back to today’s lecture. While we cannot simply insist something is true for the hell of it, we do need to trust our feelings. A student in a seminar I am in recently accused Dinshaw of simply repeating a bunch of pop-culture sentimentality about past—I think this person is wrong, but I do think that the risk of sentimentality is eminent and priceless. I think that to start negotiating this problem, we need to feel for each other.

EDIT, 10/28:

Part of what I am perhaps failing to say above, is that affect may take us beyond economy in the problem of sharing ideas and work, in the problem of negotiating the individual and collective in thinking the future on utopian terms, in a radically secularized way. And this is what I mean when I say secularization, to preempt Sarahs's inevitable comments: a wearing down of the machinations of thurmatological and credal belief which enforce and discipline bodies into compulsory relations to other bodies and temporalities--and are so often complicit in state power; radicalized this secularization responds to the potential e(/a)ffects of queer bodies in time, resistances to power which are not clearly "secular" (when secular itself calls forth a concept rooted not in eliminating thurmatology but, relocating it in the Human and (always) his Reason. I had been thinking that Caputo's insistence on a kind of faith which could happen for believers and non-believers alike must be called the theology that he calls it, and that theology MUST be a dirty word. Insofar as he and his ideas use the word 'god' perhaps this is the case. But, perhaps not. Certain events are not secular according to the old style Humanist project. I think the time of this potential communal intellectual labor, in which individual intellects mediate and are mediated by effectual relations, and ideas emerge from that relation, may require and produce certain of mechanism of radicalized faith, or impossible radical hope in the possibility of an entirely Other event, arriving.


sarah said...

dan - as seems to be a habit of mine, my comment ran long so it's on danaidean. i'll be back later to respond to other aspects of this post.

Eileen Joy said...

Dan: I have responded to--indeed, highlighted--your post over at In The Middle. Cheers, Eileen

sarah bagley said...

so i've been trying to locate what it is that makes me feel so strange about this post, dan, and i think it has a lot to do with my discomfort about lindsay waters' other ideas on affectivity. i think that the ideas of his that you're addressing here are terrifically useful, and i like your spin on them very much. but i am also leery of trusting what i see to be his figuration of "feelings." i think that we are most effective when we think the intellect through affective channels, and we feel affect through intellectual channels. in your section 3, i think you do some really productive mixing of terms. you say that we need to "get out of thinking about economics, and instead think about Love" - which is very different from needing to instead simply Love. you go on to mention "believing what we feel," and "trusting our feelings." i'd be far more leery of these assertions of belief and trust if you had not mentioned that we need to think them through Love, quite possibly in addition to loving. movements based on "affectivity" often make me nervous because many of them hinge on a sort of anti-intellectualism - they depend on the binary opposition between feeling and intellect. i think that the space of feeling is the only location that real (creative) intellection occurs.

i realized one very interesting place that this plays out, which i think really nicely encapsulates a lot of the stuff we've been thinking about for a long time - the word "passion." i'm talking about it in my own blog today.